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**A HISTORY OF CULTURE AS AN INDEPENDENT DISCIPLINE OF
HISTORICAL RESEARCH
AND FELIKS KONECZNY'S CONCEPT OF CIVILISATION**

The aim of this article is to give a brief profile of the reorientation in Polish historiography in the latest 19th and the beginning of 20th century. During the process of modernisation the methodological vision of historical science has changed. Traditional academic historiography concentrated on political and diplomatic events lost significance in value. Apart from economic history a history of culture has become increasingly one of the most popular area of interest.

In the first part of this article I tried to show how the history of culture gained independency among the other discipline existing in 19th century Polish historical knowledge.

In the second part I tried to reconstruct the reflection of civilisation of Feliks Koneczny who is still less known as a historian. I located his considerations on the ground of history of culture.

As a result the article demonstrates how Koneczny's research practice and his theoretical conceptions break away from tradition and transcend the level of its contemporary theoretical experience.

Dariusz Jeziorny

**WHAT TO DO WITH CENTRAL EUROPE? THE PLACE
OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AMONG THE BRITISH WAR AIMS 1914–1918**

On 12th August 1914 His Majesty Government in London declared the war against the Habsburg Monarchy. There was no serious political, strategical and economic interest of Great Britain in Central Europe before World War I. And that is why Great Britain and Austria-Hungary had no serious conflict in history of their bilateral relations. It appeared to be very clear, when Herbert Asquith (British Prime Minister) was announcing British war aims in August–September 1914 and no statement touched the Francis Joseph's Empire. Nevertheless the main German ally and the biggest colonial empire began struggle.

First preparations towards establishing new order in post-war Europe took place in London in late 1916. Some politicians took up also problems of Central European future. Two main points of view appeared during the long discussion. The first camp wanted the Dual Monarchy to be saved. There were different reasons of such a position of the so called "Austrophils". Lord Robert Cecil (Assistant Secretary in FO), general Johannes Smuts (member of the Cabinet and of the Imperial War Cabinet) and even the Prime Minister David Lloyd George wanted to maintain Austria-Hungary as an important factor of the European ballance of power. Lord Alfred Milner (very influential member of the War Cabinet and the Secretary of War Office since April 1918) and his supporters preferred to repeat Austro-Hungarian patterns in reconstruction of the British colonial empire. The British Catholics (many served in FO and Diplomatic Service) were helping the Habsburg Monarchy regarded as a Catholic and conservative power. The London City (national and family connections of London and Vienna banks were very often) were afraid of financial destabilisation after breakup of Austria-Hungary. Finally radical circles of Independent Labour Party declared their "hands off" Austria-Hungary because they argued against nationalism, which could appear in the "balkanised" Central Europe.

The second group (so called "Austrophobes") were led by two very powerful person professor Robert W. Seton-Watson (editor of "The New Europe", founder of The School of Slavonic and East European Studies) and Henry W. Steed (foreign editor of "The Times"). They both claimed right of self-determination for Central European Slavonic nationalities. They had their loyal supporters in some very effective and influential governmental departments, f.i. in Department of Information Intelligence Bureau, transformed in March 1918 into Foreign Office as Political Intelligence Department and Enemy Propaganda Department.

His Majesty Government took no final decision about the future of Austria-Hungary. As far as Central Europe was concerned, the leading idea of British diplomacy was not to interfere politically or military in that region which was regarded as a very dangerous and unstable one. Such "wait and see" policy led to breakup of the Habsburg Monarchy and to final destabilisation of the whole region, which lasted during the interwar period.

Witold Jarno

GARRISON IN PIOTRKOW TRYBUNALSKI (1921-1939)

Following the demobilisation of the Polish Army in 1921, the country was divided into ten military districts. One of these was the IVth Corps District in Łódź. This district encompassed three infantry divisions, which included the 7th Infantry Division stationed in Częstochowa, Lubliniec and Piotrków Trybunalski.

This article is about the history of garrison in Piotrków Trybunalski, mostly about his conversion from the war organisation that obliged in 1921 to the peace time structures. The history of our garrison during peace time was finished in August in 1939 together with declaration of mobilization.

The fundamental part is dedicated to particular activity of detachments which were stationed in Piotrków Trybunalski. The biggest from them was 25 Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division), but during 1921-1939 there were a lot of smaller regiments which were created our garrison. He was under authority of IVth Corps District in Łódź of the Polish Army.

There is also a distribution of soldiers daily life, educational, sports and culture activity and cooperation with paramilitary organisations. As well are mentioned: Military Hospital and platoon of military police.

Paulina Matera

FRENCH RESERVATION TO THE "HOOVER MORATORIUM" FROM 20th JUNE 1931

The year 1931 was particularly hard period of the Great Depression that began in October 1929. The serious crisis could be observed in Germany. It revealed in bankruptcies of many enterprises and banks. On the 26th May 1931 there was a crash in the Berlin Stock.

That is why the President of the United States – Herbert Hoover decided to announce the one-year moratorium on all the "governmental" payments: the war debts and reparations. This decision was caused by numerous connections between American capital and Germany, but Hoover officially stated it was for improving international co-operation and economic situation of the world. All main powers approved this proposal, but the government of France submitted many

reservations. According to the French point of view, moratorium was contradictory to the “Young Plan” from 1930. They wanted Germany to pay the “unconditional” part of their reparations. For the French moratorium not only provoked the danger of abandonment of reparations but also the departure from the principles of Versailles Treaty.

On the 27th June 1931 in Paris the conversations between French and American politicians were begun. After many divergences, the agreement was finally reached on the 6th July. The French forced the solution that “unconditional” part of reparations would be paid to the Bank of International Settlements and would be given back to Germany as the loan.

The attitude of France delayed the coming into force of moratorium. It also destroyed “the psychological effect” of Hoover’s proposition, which did not restore confidence and spirit of international co-operation.

Lucyna Chmielewska

NAZI FOREIGN POLICY IN KAZIMIERZ CZAPIŃSKI’S PUBLICISM (1933–1939)

The article attempts to show how Kazimierz Czapiński saw and commented the activity of Hitler's diplomacy. Kazimierz Czapiński (1882–1941) was an activist of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), a member of Parliament and an active journalist. As a socialist and democrat Czapiński opposed Nazism. He criticized Nazi policy of ekspansionism forwards the Central-East Europe.

Since the Nazi Party (NSDAP) came to power in Germany (1933) Czapiński emphasized a war danger. He hoped Europe could avoid a new war by organizing a coalition of democratic states – Great Britain, France, Soviet Union and other states. Since 1937 Czapiński had not seen Soviet Union as the ally of democratic states. He thought the anti-Nazi peaceful coalition could be consolidated because the United States would have more interest in European political situation. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact surprised Czapiński. He recognized it as a treacherous pact of two totalitarian states.