

Krzysztof Lik

THE UTRECHT TREATY IN OPINION OF SELECTED WORKS XX-CENTURY OF BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY

The Utrecht Treaty signed on 11 IV 1713, in fact ending the war of Spanish succession, turned out to be one of those turning points which finally formed the XVIII-century Europe and secured an exceptional place in political system of that century for the British monarchy.

No wonder that Utrecht Treaty, and events proceeding it, were the main object of interest in the British historiography for a long time. The period of Queen Anna's reign, QSL distinguished people appearing at her court were described by many historians. Unfortunately those works are not well-known among Polish publicity. The issues of the war of Spanish succession and the Utrecht Treaty are not the most favourite topics among Polish historian either.

For the above reasons Polish reader who want to get some knowledge on that subject may have problems as the only sources of information can be found in textbooks accessible in university libraries and institutes of history. However, it should be stressed that such textbooks are totally different from those we know in our Polish conditions. They are very detailed works presenting both historical knowledge and literary values. It is worth mentioning that among writers who created them were such superb names as dark or Trevelyan and they were edited by British best publishing companies like C.U.P., O.U.P. or Longman.

In this article one could find five historical books which in my opinion are the most representative for the XXth century British historiography. These are:

The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. I, *The Old Empire from the Beginings to 1783*.

G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England*.

The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. VII, *The Old Regime*.

Sir George dark. *The Later Stuarts* and Frank O'Gorman, *The Long Eighteenth Century*.

Małgorzata Ludwisiak

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU HIS INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARIES

This article is a part of a text in which the author tries to grasp a relation between sentimentalism and a huge interest for antiquity in a last three decades of the XVIIIth century. Following this relationship leads to Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). As well his work and its influence as the eighteenth century “antiquity mania” form a part of a new, secularized world in times of “critical years” (an expression of Paul Hazard). The author of the text tries to explain a phenomenon of an enormous influence of Rousseau on his contemporaries and an extreme editorial success of his works. The man – it's proved – mentally ill was able to attract the whole reading Europe. Rousseau questioned the base of Enlightenment: in times of adoration for civilization and reason he defended the rights of nature and feeling. He had paradoxical, firm opinions, enthusiasm and a good style. Still during his lifetime he became an object of worship not only thanks to his literary works (*The New Heloise*, *Emile, or Education* and *Confessions*) but also his controversial way of life. Since publishing his first discourse he was trying to adjust himself to the radical opinions he announced, so he broke with a social life of Paris, left the city

and even started to dress differently.

Rousseau was a very emotional person with an intense imagination. His emotions always predominated over his rational thinking and his work is full of discrepancies. During his life, especially in last twenty years, his mental and physical illness and paranoia manifested and intensified. There were many diagnosis made since the XIXth century but more important than that seems the writer himself used his illness. He didn't even suspect a pathological character of his behavior but in the same time it was a great excuse for him to avoid company of others and lead his solitary life, complying this way unconsciously with expectations of his readers. His admirers perceived him as a suffering man, a laic saint.

In Poland Rousseau was the same popular as in the rest of Europe which can be proved by an example of three Polish aristocrats: Helena Radziwiłłowa, Izabela Lubomirska and Izabela Czartoryska – their libraries, letters, gardens and collections of true and false remembrances of Jean Jacques. The free women collected antique pieces, read Roman literature and constructed in their gardens false ruins with inscriptions from antique poets. The mutual deep relationship between these two important currents in the culture of late Enlightenment should be a subject of a separate study.

Magdalena Wasiewicz

PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IN THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE IN 1947

This article presents the activity of US Delegation during the Moscow Conference in the spring 1947. The Ambassador of the US in Moscow General Walter Bedell Smith had installed the American Delegation in an improvised office in the Embassy residence, Spaso House. All of the members of the Delegation had difficulty adjusting to Moscow habits of work through the night.

The East-West negotiations in 1947 primarily concerned the future of Germany. The United States tried unsuccessfully to advance the prospects of Germany's reunification and demilitarization. The Soviets were extremely negative and would agree to nothing. Therefore the US Secretary of State General Marshall met Stalin on April 15, 1947. The meeting took eighty-eight minutes. Stalin listened while Marshall gave a situation report on the afflictions of the world and the need for peace. But Stalin expressed the view that present disagreement resembled a family quarrel. The impression made by Stalin on General Marshall was certainly one of the main causes of The Marshall Plan.

Moreover in Moscow neither the Americans nor the Soviets had any intentions of working towards a Peace Treaty with Germany and German reunification. Moscow was the end of a road, the finish of a grand attempt by American democracy to get along with Russian communism.

Jakub Sołtysiak

THE ISSUE OF DEPLOYMENT OF UN MILITARY FORCES IN CONGO (15 JUNE – 12 AUGUST 1960)

On 19 June 1960 the UN Security Council passed the resolution no 143 (1960), which enabled the start of the UN Operation in Congo – Operation des Nations

Unies Au Congo (ONUC). The operation was to consist of two parts: civilian and military, foreseeing sending UN Armed Forces to Congo.

The deployment of UN soldiers in Congo was subject of much controversy at the UN forum. The first month of UN soldiers involvement in Congo's crisis was of crucial importance for defining the character of the military operation. Controversies arose about the powers of UN soldiers, and the way of placement of Peace Forces in Katanga. The group of countries put pressure to settle the conflict by force.

The additional problem was the desire of world powers, competing for influence in Africa, to use the whole conflict to achieve vested interests. There was no agreement as to the way the UN soldiers and their powers were to be used in the face of key Congo's problems. In that case the character of UN Operation in Congo was brought up for an international discussion. As a result of this discussion, and due to determination of UN Secretary – General Dag Hammarskjöld, supported by American diplomacy, the international character of UN military operation was kept. Not using UN Forces to immediate political goals was another success. Despite different pressures, Hammarskjöld managed to deploy UN Military Forces to Katanga by means of diplomatic and peaceful methods, exclusively.

Anna Porczyńska

THE JOHN F. KENNEDY GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TO THE CONGO CRISIS ON THE FORUM OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1961–1963)

The Congo Crisis was one of the conflicts which involved economical and military power of the United Nations under presidency of John F. Kennedy. The United States had already aided Belgium but they weren't able to solve that problem by using the US Army in Secessionist Katanga because it would lead to the direct confrontation with the USSR and its satellite countries.

The second reason was connected with involvement of American private business in Katangian industry and the attempts of its exclusion made by Belgians or Patrice Lumumba's forces.

The John F. Kennedy Government attitude was determined by his predecessors policy of the containment, which should be successful in the decolonized areas. The John F. Kennedy Government attitude towards the United Nations during the Congo Crisis was determined by the majority in General Assembly created by newly independent African countries which supported the Soviet Union and his allies. That was the main cause why previously adopted "majority voting" in General Assembly was impossible for the John F. Kennedy Government.