

Aleksander Boldyrew

MILITARY ACCESSORIES AT GÓRNICKI'S WORKS

This study deals with military accessories in XVIth century Poland in the light of historiographical relations, that is things and matters connected with an army, military services (an emphasis was put on accessories used by a soldier). The study is based on two works by Ł. Górnicki *Dworzanin polski* and *Dzieje w Koronie Polskiej*. Ł. Górnicki (1527–1603) was a courtier of bishops S. Maciejowski and A. Zebrzydowski, an envoy to Vienna and even a secretary of king Sigismund II August. Weapon knowledge systematics was preserved in the work, that is a division into offensive and defensive weapon and military equipment.

Among offensive weapon Ł. Górnicki mentioned sabres which became more and more popular in XVIth century in Poland. It is worth mentioning that both swords and knives producers were applying for the right to produce the sabres. Another offensive weapon was a "hauswehre" – sword numbered by the contemporary of those days, just like a sabre, among fighting knives. This kind of weapon was cheap and easily available. Ł. Górnicki described an unfortunate accident which took place during a shooting show and in the time of Sigismund II August's visit at Prussian duke's. In this description the author mentioned a sephelin. It was as a short spear with a big spearhead and spearshaft bound with leather bands. There is also a remark on trench mortars and problems faced by gunner who obviously did not know parabolic theory of bullet lead. Górnicki described also several tournaments organized at the king's court, for instance the one in 1533 or in 1539. It is possible to find not only descriptions of tournament customs (e.g. *hastiludium hussaronicum*) but also armament, mainly protective. Górnicki also noticed personal participation of Sigismund II August in knights' struggles and he described fighting horses, which mirrors the role of horses in life of noblemen especially an army in Renaissance Poland. It was emphasized that people risked their life to capture horses which was frequently criticized but not abandoned.

Ł. Górnicki's account can be highly valued especially that he himself was for many years a courtier and a secretary of Sigismund II August so he knew the described reality very well. Historiographical sources – in contrast to economic sources – remark not only on the object itself but they also place it in a cultural context, which expands our knowledge of material culture history and historical weapon knowledge.

Katarzyna Czekaj

KAROL LILIENFELD-KRZEWSKI AND HIS ROLE IN BUILDING THE LEGEND OF LEGION AND OF JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI

This article is an attempt of showing the role in building an ethos of legion and the legend of Józef Piłsudski by literary work of Karol Lilienfeld-Krzewski. This figure although of its unquestionable input in the activity has gone into forgetfulness, that's why his life, as well as the rich literature, journalist and his publicity work is worth mentioning.

Karol Krzewski wasn't the first plan activist, although his participation in many important events, entrusting to positions less prominent but often crucial to the authorities, lastly the remarkable personality, made him highly valued figure in political circles and popular among wide masses of community of the II RP (Pepublic of Poland).

The participant of a Riflemen's Association in Galicja, a soldier in The First

Brigade of Polish Legions, an activist in Polish War Organization, the participant of war 1920, (political) commentator of the belweder camp, one of the founder of its political programme, the member of Polish Radio's management, employee of the Military Institute of Science and Education, lastly a soldier of the September campaign and an associate of Marszałek Śmigły-Rydz while his residence in Romania – Krzewski's life and career was determined by the most important attempts in the history of two decades of the XX-th century.

Although in the awareness of the contemporaries Krzewski remained popular *Kapral Szczapa*, which adventure became the basis of a book, that made its author not only famous but also built one of the legends around the figure of Józef Piłsudski. The authoress of this article tried to show (point out) the most characteristic elements of this legend, as well as the whole legion mythology, presented in Krzewski's work. She analyzed not only the literary work *Kapral Szczapa* but also the work connected with the legion and military campsite theatre press. The analyze, in confrontation with other similar front-line publications, allowed to place *Szczapa* in the rich trend of legion literacy.

Krzewski's work in this period: literary, in the front-line publications and on the stage of campsite theatre was the reflection of consolidation process which occurred in the group associated with Józef Piłsudski, the document of the reality in military service and life in the dig in around Wołyń, lastly the reflection of political conflicts of those times.

Worth mentioning is the original, unique language, which uses Krzewski and which is the characteristic for the whole legion environment, code understood and used only by the soldiers of this concrete military unit.

Another specific element is the always present and unique military humor, very well seen in *Kapral Szczapa*. What strikes is its sharp, mockery and malice. The language and humor are mostly used to propagate the glory of First Brigade and her Commanding officer. The next thing that strikes is the uncritical relation to the decisions, plans, resolutions of Piłsudski and the recognition of elitism of his soldiers.

Krzewski's work is also a proof of how strong and deeply ingrained in those times was the cult of Józef Piłsudski among the members of his camp. The conflicts inside the whole political camp found also a reflection in *Kapral Szczapa*. There are lots of mockery and malice remarks about the Military Department NKN, the members of Legion Headquarters, contemptuous attitude to the Austrian headquarters and the whole c.k. army.

To sum up, this article is meant to show the impact and popularity, which *Kapral Szczapa* received (obtained) not only at war among followers of Józef Piłsudski. At the same time this work is a document of its age, original historical source, the work of creative intelligence, which concentrated around Józef Piłsudski in the times of First World War and which gave the beginning to the strongest political camp in the II Republic of Poland.

Robert Urbaniak

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE ŁÓDŹ – “REPUBLIKA” 1923–1925

On the 6th January 1923 the first issue of the “Republika”, the new newspaper, came out. It was founded by Maurycy Ignacy Poznański, Leszek Kirkien, Władysław Polak and Marian Nusbaum-Ołtaszewski – the last one became the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. Since it was published for the rich bourgeoisie, the “Republika”, as the name suggested, was liberal in its character, as well as in the choice of

cooperators, and it never got close to any political party. The newspaper dealt with social, literary and trade issues. The head office of the editors was at 49 Piotrkowska Street, whereas the correspondents of the newspaper sent information from many European capitals and Polish cities.

The "Republika" also used information provided by Polish Telegraphic Agency among others. The new publication found readers in Łódź and the region and after its position became well established on the Łódź press market, its daily edition on weekdays was up to 20 thousand copies, and it was the biggest edition among morning newspapers in Łódź in the period described. The "Republika" consisted of thematic sections led by the editors responsible for them. Due to the connections of the newspaper with Łódź industrial circles, its trade division, "Kurier Handlowy", whose director was Leszek Kirkien and where Maurycy Ignacy Poznański also published his articles, was well developed and came out regularly.

Since the summer of 1925 the publication came into conflict with the authorities, which led to closing down the prosperous newspaper. Its successor the "Ilustrowana Republika", published since 28th July 1925. It resembled its predecessor with graphic design, layout, themes and choice of editors. The editor-in-chief of the new newspaper became Leszek Kirkien.

Marta Węcłewska

**THE POLISH DILEMMA IN A "TIME FOR ANGELS".
REGARDING THE ATTEMPT TO FORGE ON AGREEMENT CONCERNING
EUROPEAN SECURITY 1926–1929 AND IDEAS ABOUT POLISH FOREIGN
POLICY AS VIEWED BY "THE WARSAW GAZETTE"**

One of the most difficult tasks regarding Polish foreign policy throughout the interwar period was developing its international position. A position which would be compatible with the Polish "raison d'état" of the time; the attempt to forge on international agreement of European security. This problem, among other things, was based on the relationship between Poland and Germany and, as a consequence, Polish policy was aimed at sticking to the Treaty of Versailles or obtaining a on their part similar guarantee in case this Treaty was to be abolished.

The Germans, on their part, still wished to dismantle, what they belived to be punitive dictate, laid out at Versailles. They realised, however, that they, under the representation of Gustav Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, had to change their tactic into more peaceful ones. It was well known that, the Germans overtly harboured designs on the Polish territories of Silesia, the Pommerania and Prusia corridor and Danzig, a free city, whose foreign affairs were determined by Poland.

Under such circumstances the most important task of Polish foreign policy relied upon defending the best position it could in European affairs and keeping the diplomatic initiative. Nevertheless, that said, this task was incompatible with the main trends of European diplomacy. The policy of friendship between western countries, especially Germany, France and Great Britain had led to the inclusion of Germany into the Council of the League of Nations, dissolving the Inter-Allied Commission of Control and finally the evacuation of the Rhineland. In all these matters Poland had a little or no to say. Her position being limited to that of a witness.

Obviously the weakening international position of Poland was well observed and described by the "The Warsaw Gazette" – the then a Polish nationalists' newspaper. The deadlock between the Polish foreign policy objectives and that of the European diplomatic trends could not be rectified. Even the National Democratic Party, who

was at the time in opposition and thus having less responsibility for policy had no clear idea on how to find a solution. Journalists working for "The Warsaw Gazette" on the one hand correctly recognised the direction of the political changes in Europe, favouring Germany, but on the other, did not accept, some would say illogically, that these changes would result in a loosening of the alliance with France. Due to Poland's constant efforts in defending the system set out in the Treaty of Versailles, its influence on the great international conferences was marginalized. Disappointed by that fact "Gazette" journalists pressed on the importance of the French alliance as a valuable and safeguard of the security of Poland, even if the policy of friendship with Germany, made by the French government, was not, from Polish point of view, fair. This was done as it was still believed that Warsaw and Paris had common agendas on foreign affairs, especially when it came to maintaining the post-war European system. However, as pessimism reached its zenith, commentators from "The Warsaw Gazette" suggested all nation's forces be concentrated to the defence of the country and, as far as they were concerned, Poland needed help from western allies. These fundamental difficulties in Polish dilemmas were never solved. Even today the question still remains whether this tragic finale was the fault of the Polish foreign policy or independent factors connected with the contemporary E international trends.

Łukasz Abramczyk

FROM THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THIRD REICH AND SOUTHERN IRELAND (1939–1945)

The purpose of this article is to create the general outlook of diplomatic relationship between Hitler's Germany and Southern Ireland during Second World War. The article opens with a presentation of limited German and Irish contacts since 1914 to 1921, and general mutual relations before the War.

In the next part of the article, both Irish and German conceptions on war policy are being characterised in an attempt to confront harsh Irish policy of neutrality with German endeavours to subordinate De Valera's government.

Another problem is related with Abwehra's trying her hand in cooperation with radical fractions of IRA. Those attempts didn't result in warming relations between both governments. In another part of this article is description of German military plans considering invasion of Southern Ireland as a part of operation *Seelöwe*.

Magdalena Wasiewicz

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR WALTER B. SMITH WITH VIACZESLAV MOLOTOV 4 AND 9 OF MAY 1948

The article presents the activity of the US Ambassador to Soviet Union W.B. Smith during the international tensions of 1948.

The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia was the first and most consequential of the chain of events that occurred in the early months of 1948. The Czech coup catalyzed diplomatic developments in western Europe. On 17 March Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact.

The Truman administration was much more concerned about developments in Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Marshall instructed Ambassador Smith to arrange a meeting with Foreign Minister Molotov to inform him about American

foreign policy objectives. Smith was instructed to warn the Soviet minister against any acts of aggression and to assure him the United States had no hostile intention against the Soviet Union. On 4 May Ambassador Smith met with Molotov to discuss Soviet-American relations.

Ambassador Smith said American policies were basically defensive, were supported by American people, and did not threaten the Soviet Union. On 9 May Foreign Minister Molotov responded to the 4 May statement of Ambassador Smith. Molotov denied the charges made by American Ambassador. He accused the United States of being responsible for Soviet-American tensions. 11 May, Soviet radio and press published the exchange of views between Ambassador Smith and Molotov. American officials assumed the exchange of views would be considered confidential.

The same day Henry Wallace, the former secretary of commerce in the Truman administration, wrote an open letter to Josef Stalin. Wallace was one of the leaders of the left-wing Democrats. In his letter Wallace called for an end of the cold war.

State Department concluded that the actions of the Soviet Union to make public the record of the Smith-Molotov talks and Stalin's reply to Wallace's open letter, indicated it was more interested in scoring a propaganda victory than in seriously attempting to resolve Soviet-American differences.

Secretary of State Marshall in his speech delivered in Portland, Oregon, criticized the Soviets for making the diplomatic exchange public, without consulting the United States.

The Smith-Molotov notes and the Wallace-Stalin correspondence troubled government officials because they threatened to undermine public and congressional support for those policies.

Joanna Maj

THE EVOLUTION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1950'S

Regarding the size of their territories and the number of population, China and India take an important place among Asian countries.

Since the appearance of independent India (1947) and the People's Republic of China (1949) on international arena, the terms of these countries have gone through all possible sorts of stages. The present study investigates the Sino-Indian relations in nineteen fifties, which can be divided into three principal stages. 1950–1954, when India supported the Republic of China on international area, however, without definite political resonance on the part of the Chinese; the period of Sino-Indian cooperation on international forum as well as bilateral contacts on political, economical and cultural grounds in 1954–1957, and the stage from 1958 that has been characterized by anti-Indian attitude of Chinese governmental circles.

The complexity of the relations was to a large scale the result of Chinese policy rather than the position of Indian government, regarded as more stable and consistent. It was the Chinese foreign policy that affected the climate of relations between both nations, and dramatic turns in these contacts resulted not only from change of selection of means to achieve Chinese basic political aims but also internal situation in Communist China. However, one should bear in mind that it was India that were more active in the period of creating these relations. Indian authorities believed that it was their responsibility to continue the millennial tradition of peaceful relations with China, although it mainly resulted from the existence of natural Himalayan border, making land military penetration impossible. The friendly relations with China were closely connected with J. Nehru's conception to grant Asia a proper position in international relations.

In these plans, India was about to play a part of the spokesman of Asian nations and the initiator of cooperation, which could have become an example for liberating colonial countries and also an alternative to double-blocked policy.

Therefore, mainly because of these reasons, India had been insistently supporting the People's Republic of China on international arena.

Not to complicate Sino-Indian relations, India had given up traditional policy of supporting pro-independence endeavours of Tibet. The real symptom of Sino-Indian international cooperation was the settlement of common conception of creating "a peace zone" in Asia region that was promoted in policy of these countries in years 1954–1957. The above mentioned initiative assumed the avoidance of conflicts among Asian countries with common efforts and diplomatic consultations supported also by countries outside Asian continent.

It was in middle fifties when the premises of struggle for leadership in the area of Asia already appeared. The disturbing with regards of international aspect of Sino-Indian rivalry about leadership in Third World was revealed.

First of all, Chinese and Indian businesses clashed on plain of international safety in Himalayan region. The safety had been violated by already mentioned different interpretation of borders, as well as policy of sides in neighboring countries of Burma, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

The fact of the existence of the border divergences may not have led to armed conflict between China and India, as in principle controversial regions did not matter economically. In fact, the border dispute became a pretext in strife about hegemony in Asia.

Patrycja Domejko-Kozera

POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JOSÉ MARÍA AZNAR TOWARDS CUBA (1996–2004)

After the victory of People's Party (Partido Popular) in the election on 3 March 1996 the government of José María Aznar with the foresight of protection of human rights and democratization adopted a strict policy towards Cuba, the country linked with Spain by numerous bonds: historical, linguistic, cultural, economic ones, not to mention relations of sovieties. This change was the result of the strategy formulated by the PP government of alliance with the USA whose relations with Castro regime had been hostile for years. The stages in the Spanish-Cuban relations in the years 1996–2004 coincided with periods in Washington–Havana relations. The following stages can be distinguished in this period: gradual deterioration of bilateral relations leading to diplomatic crisis (May 1996 – April 1998), normalization (from April 1998) and renewed crisis (with the climax after adoption by the European Union sanctions on Cuba in June 2003). The PP government actions concerned mostly political and diplomatic spheres, both on bilateral (Spain did not appoint an ambassador in Havana for 1,5 year) and communitarian level (European Union Common Position of 2 December 1996 on Cuba, UE sanctions on Cuba). The government actions did not affect the economic sphere. Despite the fact that tension in Madrid–Havana contacts had negative effect on economy, during the years of Aznar's government Spanish trade with Cuba flourished. Having adopted a tough policy towards Cuba, the PP government criticized US embargo on Cuba and Helms–Burton Act. The policy of the government of PP towards Cuba was criticized by the opposition. It did not contribute to the improvement of human rights and democratic rules on the island, but it strengthened Spanish-American relations.