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**THE CHURCH OF ST. STANISLAS AND VACLAV AS EXAMPLE
OF „AFTER TRIDENT COUNCIL ART” IN SILESIA.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND ARTISTIC PRACTICE.**

“After Trident Council art” term refers to the sacral artistic realizations which originated after the Trident Council (1545–1563). Generally, the foundations of this art were formulated during the last (XXVth) session of the Council (3–4 December 1563) in the decree entitled *De invocatione, veneratione et reliquis sanctorum, et sacris imaginibus*. Because the decree did not give answer to many very important questions for artists, which were born during the artistic practice, detailed solutions were found by the Catholic art theoreticians, such as Johannes Molanus, Andrea Possevino, Gabriele Paleotti or Carlo Borromeo.

The Church of St. Stanislas and Vaclav in Świdnica proves that decisions of the Trident Council with reference to the sacral art were strictly realized. The formal and ideological analysis of this structure confirms that within the space of the parochial church in Świdnica were realized all topics recommended by the Council: The Christology, The St. Mary’s Cult and The Hagiography. In representations of Jesus Christ was marked the role of The Eucharist in redeem, in the scenes in which St. Mary was presented, according to the instructions of the Catholic Church, were heightened the elements such as her Immaculate Conception and Advocacy which distinguished St. Mary from other women. Finally, in the representations of the Saints, the personages of the church patrons and the founders of the Society of Jesus were marked.

Other motifs visible in the church decoration (The Trinity, The Salomon Temple, The Triumph of the Church) were repercussions of the local religious and political situation in Silesia in 17th and 18th century.

Krzysztof Lik

**THE FIGURE OF CHARLES X GUSTAV IN THE TESTIMONY OF MEMORIES
BY HUGES DE TERLON, THE AMBASSADOR OF LOUIS XIV ATTACHED
TO THE KING OF SWEDEN IN THE YEARS 1656–1660**

Charles X Gustav is probably one of the most intriguing characters of the 17th century. Even his contemporaries could not establish any unambiguous opinions about him. The rumours about his achievements were often preceding the appearance of his person, not always arising favorable connotations. Apart from being considered an outstanding commander, tactician and politician, he quite fast obtained the reputation of “the brigand of Europe”, who was capable of beginning horrors of war in any part of the old continent. The times of the Second North War and the person of Charles X Gustav have been always of great interest, even nowadays, in Scandinavian countries and became a constant element of their historical consciousness. This matter looks a little bit different on the other side of the Baltic Sea. Despite a huge interest in this period among Polish historians and numerous works written on this subject, our historiography did not devote much attention to the king of Sweden. What is more, he did not even have his own monograph, in the precise meaning of this word. One of the most valuable sources referring to Charles X Gustav are *Memories of the ambassador of Louis XIV attached to the king of Sweden – Charles X Gustav in the years 1656–1660*. Due to his position, the French diplomat – Huges de Terlon, dedicated a lot of attention to the

king of Sweden in his diaries. The image of the sovereign showed on the pages of his memories is undoubtedly very subjective, yet extremely valuable, taking into account the intimacy of the French ambassador with Charles X Gustav. What is more, this image is quite in – depth, as the memoirs' author accompanied Charles X Gustav personally not only in Poland, but also in Denmark and Sweden, having a chance to observe the king in everyday situations, in different places as well as on different occasions. Charles X Gustav appears in the memoirs all the time. Even if there is no information referring to the king of Sweden directly, he turns up as *spiritus movens* of his diplomats, commanders or allies. As it is shown in the above reflections, *Memories of the ambassador of Louis XIV by the king of Sweden – Charles X Gustav in years 1656–1660* seem to be a very interesting material. This preliminary research on the picture of the Swedish king may be an exciting contribution to a discussion about the image of Charles X Gustav in the Polish and European history.

Edyta Olejnik

THE MOROCCO QUESTION IN THE DIPLOMACY OF THEOPHILE DELCASSE 1898–1905

At the end of 19th Century, after the Fachoda crisis in French and British diplomacy, French colonialists conceived the notion to move forward in Morocco. As there was no more hope for reopening the Egyptian question, Morocco could have been a reasonable compensation for humiliation in Fachoda. France had for a long time been engaged in the Maghreb region – it had occupied Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881. Morocco was the only one left independent and, as the Madrid convention stated in 1880, all European countries had equal rights there. However a difficult domestic situation in Morocco and problems with Algerian warriors seeking refuge on Moroccan borders let the French interfere in this country.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, Théophile Delcassé, came to a decision to eliminate the rivals that would be interested in Morocco. In 1900 he signed a treaty with Italy and drew one up with Spain in 1902 that was not ratified. Under pressure of the members of the African lobby in the Chamber of Deputies, led by Eugene Étienne, and the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, he started negotiations with Great Britain about the Egypt-Morocco bargain. France would leave Egypt in English hands if England accepted her rights to Morocco. The French-British agreement regulating this and some other colonial question, called the Entente Cordiale, was signed 8 IV 1904. In addition to this treaty, the French-Spanish agreement was signed. The only power interested and left behind these negotiations was Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm II, convinced by the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Bülow, decided to make a demonstration in Morocco. At the end of March 1905, he landed in Tangier, and made a speech in favor of Moroccan independence, challenging French influence in Morocco. This manifestation of German interests in Morocco caused a lot of anxiety in France. Delcassé agreed to discuss the Moroccan issue with Germany, but Bülow preferred an international conference to be called. Many French politicians were afraid that Delcassé policy would lead to war with Germany. Prime Minister Maurice Rouvier decided to sacrifice Delcassé to eliminate this danger. Delcassé was forced out of the ministry on 6 VI 1905.

At the beginning of 1906, the international conference took place in Algeiras to settle the dispute. A free trade was decided in Morocco but Germany had to accept that France would stay the main power in this country.

THE DIVISION IN THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) AS VIEWED BY THE JOURNALISTS OF "TRIBUNE" ("TRYBUNA")

"*Trybuna*" was a magazine founded by a group of PPS (Polish Socialist Party) activists centred around Józef Piłsudski in November 1906 to propagate the political programme of the faction of "the old" that – after the split in the party – established the PPS-Frakcja Rewolucyjna (Revolutionary Faction). Among the magazine's columnists one could find the most important writers, i.e. those who belonged to the group centered around Piłsudski (Jodko, Sieroszewski, Filipowicz) as well as Żeromski, Limanowski, Daniłowski, and Orkan.

Until the formal split in the party, which took place at the 9th Congress in November 1906, the articles in "*Trybuna*" had not vigorously opposed the official party programme. Only later did the columnists of the Revolutionary Faction start strongly opposing the tactical and ideological principles of their former comrades.

Although the political programme of the Revolutionary Faction did not formally differ from the PPS agenda as the struggle for influence among party members and labourers excluded the possibility of divergence from the most important socialist demands, "*Trybuna*" emphasized those aspects of the programme which constituted the pillars of Piłsudski's conception.

The primary target of the Revolutionary Faction – as it results from articles in "*Trybuna*" – was to prepare the Polish society for an armed struggle for the independence of Poland, i.e. to train the cadres that could lead the prospective national uprising and to overcome the psychological barrier within the Polish society, which caused the people to be lethargic and passive towards the partitioners.

Another distinct matter prevalent from the very beginning in articles of "*Trybuna*" was the attitude of the Revolutionary Faction towards the revolutionary movement in Russia, which was also the cause of the split in the party. The reluctance to combine the Polish struggle for independence with a revolution in Russia is a complex issue. First of all, Piłsudski, and others activists of his group, did not believe in a swift success of Russian socialists. Both in his publications and those of members of his group, it is emphasized that according to them the crisis of the czarism is temporary and the democratic concessions were simply forced by circumstances. Thus, for Poles the events that took place in Russia could prove merely favourable, but not decisive for the Polish independence movement.

The authors of "*Trybuna*" also polemicized strongly with the conception of "tri-annexation" – an idea to win the independence of all three annexed territories as a result of a great labour revolution, which – in turn – was to establish a federation of independent states in place of the overthrown monarchies. The activists of the Faction considered such a program to be not only a Utopia, but also an act of high treason as it excluded the possibility of gaining independence even in one of the annexed territories and it would result in a federation of states, which would limit the political independence of Poland.

Another matter which divided activists of PPS were the methods of revolutionary struggle and issues related with party tactics – especially after the revolution of 1905. To put it simply, we can find that – as far as party tactics is concerned – the faction of "the young", especially since the beginning of 1905, was in favour of mass campaigns, labour protests and strike campaigns. Whereas according to Piłsudski, the party should be concerned with stimulating the labour movement and controlling it, so that premature demonstrations would not take place as it could weaken the powers of the proletariat and damage the cause of the struggle for

independence. In his plans, PPS was supposed to change its focus from mass activities to terrorist-conspirational ones.

"*Trybuna*" was being published until September 1907. The publication was stopped because of financial reasons as well as because it had fulfilled its objectives as the organ of the faction. i.e. in its articles the first principles of an official cohesive political programme of the newly established PPS-Frakcja Rewolucyjna (Revolutionary Faction) had been formulated.

Marta Węcłewska

THE GERMAN'S PROPAGANDA CONCERNING POLISH TERRITORIES 1926–1930 AS VIEWED BY "THE WARSAW GAZETTE" ("GAZETA WARSZAWSKA") IN THE YEARS 1926–1930

One of the most difficult problems regarding the relationship between Poland and Germany during the interwar period was the German's revanchist propaganda which was made in the Weimar Republic. The general situation was as a result of the dissatisfaction the German nation had with the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles. This was seen by Germany as both shameful and unjust, especially concerning blame for the outbreak of the First World War, Germany being disarmed and some of their provinces being given directly to Poland, amongst others.

The political atmosphere in Europe in the twenties was not conducive to raising these issues. The Weimar Republic wanted to be regarded as a new democratic country. The policy of friendship with France and Great Britain did not let Germany speak aggressively about their demands. Therefore, German revanchism was turned mainly against Poland due to it being safer and not involving the western Allies. Meanwhile it was a convenient way to expressing the German people's dissatisfaction and frustration.

The Polish National Democratic Party thought that the most important subject in Polish foreign policy should have been keeping to the principle of the Treaty of Versailles. The party was interested in recognising even the slightest traces of German revanchism. The Polish nationalists' newspaper "The Warsaw Gazette" constantly showed examples of The Weimar Republic's propaganda. The evidence came from many different sources, in an attempt to make the Polish nation aware of how frequently revanchist demands were made in German society.

The revanchist campaigning was popular not only among politicians and political parties, organizations and associations but also with scientific institutions, the press, cinema and educational establishment. Besides showing popularity of the revanchism, "The Warsaw Gazette" gave countless examples of German propaganda claiming rights to these areas of, what was then, Poland. These claims included historical justification to them remaining German and questionable quality scientific papers concerning the detrimental economic and cultural consequence of losing, what they regarded, "indigenous" territory.

Naturally, besides informing its readership, "The Gazette" analysed the Polish government's policy regarding anti-Polish propaganda in The Weimar Republic. The nationalist press proposed a solution which might have proved Polish rights to the disputable territories. "The Gazette" also emphasized that Poland would never agree to any territorial change.

Patrycja Domejko-Kozera

**SPAIN TOWARDS NATO AS VIEWED BY NEWSPAPER
“EL PAÍS” IN THE YEARS 1975–1996**

When NATO was created in 1949 Spain could not join the organization because of the authoritarian nature of general Francisco Franco regime and its cooperation with fascist Germany and Italy during the II World War. However, the USA recognized the strategic importance of Spanish territory in the period of cold war confrontation and initiated bilateral relations with Madrid in the security policy sphere in 1953. The informal cooperation of Spanish military forces with NATO followed. It was the end of the dictatorship and democratic transformation of the country that enabled Spain's integration with the organizations of Western world. Once integration with NATO was possible, this issue sharply divided political elites of democratic Spain with the left generally opposing the accession to NATO and the right supporting it. Spain officially became a member of NATO in 1982 but in the same year the socialists came to power with a promise of referendum on the question of Spanish membership in NATO. The socialist government of Felipe González „froze” Spanish integration with this organization but finally pragmatic approach won: it did not lead Spain out of NATO but defined specific conditions of its membership (mainly not joining the integrated military structure). The end of the cold war confrontation and collapse of the USSR resulted in the necessity for NATO to adjust its character and tasks to the new circumstances. González's government supported this transformation and Spanish forces actively participated in the new missions of NATO, which built Spanish reputation as a credible ally, the symbol of which was the election of Spanish ministry of foreign affairs Javier Solana for the post of Secretary General of the organization.